Absent qualia are impossible - a reply to Block
Identity, Cause, and Mind September 4, 2003 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199264698.003.0015 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Block's rebuttal to the author's argument for the impossibility of absent qualia is unsuccessful, and reaffirms the claim that absent qualia are impossible, with implications for the nature of qualia and functionalist theories of mind. |
Abstract
Abstract In his recent paper “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” (hereafter AAQI),1 Ned Block attempts to rebut an argument I gave for an affirmative answer to his title question in my paper, “Functionalism and Qualia” (hereafter F&Q).2 The issues raised by this controversy go far beyond the question of whether a particular argument of mine is successful. The question of what account we are to give of “qualia” (of the “qualitative” /”phenomenal “/”subjective”/”raw feel” aspects of the mental), or of what can and cannot sensibly be said about them, is one of the most central issues in the philosophy of mind.