Consciousness is an intriguing mystery, of which standard accounts all have well-known difficulties. This book examines the central question about consciousness: that is, the question of how phenomenal features of our experience are related to physical features of our nervous system. Using the way in which we experience color as a central case, it develops a novel account of how consciousness...
AbstractThis chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private language argument. And it contrasts this proposal with relatively close competitor proposals by Chalmers and Yablo. It propounds a kind of semantic two-dimensionalism, and is less centered on...
AbstractThis chapter argues that the correct internalist account of perceptual experience involves four key claims, that sensory contents are qualia, that experiences of qualia are constituted in a necessary a posteriori manner by internal physical states, that these states have the modal structural architecture pioneered for color experience by Hardin, and that intentionalism is the correct...