Colors, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia
Philosophical Issues 1996 DOI: 10.2307/1522891 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 12 |
| Key points | Argues that the author and Harman agree on several core claims about color perception: subjective reactions belong in an account of color, perceptual experience is representational, colors are experienced as features of external objects, and color is experienced as a simple basic quality rather than a disposition or causal complex. The author also endorses Harman's view that introspection reveals presentational content rather than mental paint. |
Abstract
Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that subjective reactions must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a or representational character, and that is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, color is experienced as a simple basic quality, rather than a disposition or complex of causal properties. As Harman emphasized in an earlier paper,1 what we are introspectively aware of in our experience is its presentational or representational content, not any mental paint which bestows this content. I shall refer to all of this as Harman's