SLOMAN AND H-CONSCIOUSNESS
International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843010000242 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Sloman's critique of one-sided definitions of machine consciousness is partially valid, but his neglect of non-reductive aspects leads him to side with reductivism, undermining his intended aims. |
Abstract
Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.