Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI. On the one hand, we could assume insentience but risk doing terrible harms to entities that deserve moral standing. On the other hand, we could assume sentience and instead risk wasting resources on insentient machines. The intractability of questions around AI...
AI has displayed notable originality across the worlds of art, science and gaming. But is it right to say that such machines are creative? This question is bound up with other challenging questions about the capacities of artificial systems. Human creativity typically involves some conscious experience of the creative project. If consciousness is necessary for creativity, then a case could be...
Devlin Brown takes on the weighty task of determining the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. He delivers on this project over three parts that consider in turn: whether physicalism is compatible with various metaphysical consolations obtaining; whether the case for existential optimism defeats the case for existential pessimism; and whether there’s a version of physicalism we...
Could an AI have conscious experiences? Any answer to this question should conform to Evidentialism - that is, it should be based not on intuition, dogma or speculation but on solid scientific evidence. I argue that such evidence is hard to come by and that the only justifiable stance on the prospects of artificial consciousness is agnosticism. In the current debate, the main division is...
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a method used to teach machines to process and experience data/information the way humans do. The claustrum, the cellular unit of the nervous system that communicates with the body through electrical patterns, is an excellent model for AI when trying to derive consciousness. It has been used as a model for neural networks to teach machines to process, experience,...
Self-Representationalists hold that conscious mental states are conscious in virtue of suitably representing themselves, and that awareness of a mental state is achieved by representing oneself as being in that state. Where Higher-Order Representationalists claim that awareness of a mental state is conferred by a distinct mental state that represents it, Self-Representationalists instead argue...
Kriegel's self-representationalist (SR) theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to 'demystify' consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the...
In his paper 'Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness' (2015, this journal), Kemmerer defends a conservative account of consciousness, according to which concepts and thoughts do not characterize the contents of consciousness, and then uses that account...