In this paper we introduce two dimensions over which current and recent theories of consciousness vary. These dimensions are (1) vehicle versus process theories, and (2) non-specialized versus specialized theories. Vehicle theories of consciousness propose that consciousness arises from some inherent property of mental representations or neural systems, irrespective of the computations they...
AbstractAlthough information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
The intentional properties and subjective qualities of conscious states pose special problems for physicalism. Yet 'consciousness' is a term of the vernacular that picks out such a heterogeneous group of phenomena that it will not be a good explanandum for science. This thesis adopted the position that we are licensed to theorize about the phenomena of consciousness, provided we are careful to...