2 Principles of Demarcation
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind November 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that proposed marks of the cognitive supporting extended cognition fail to meet the desiderata for demarcation or are otherwise unsatisfactory, thereby questioning whether a principled distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive processes can be established. |
Abstract
AbstractIn this chapter, it is assumed that, in order for the debate over extended cognition (and mind) to have substance, there must be a genuine distinction between what is cognitive and what is not. This motivates the search for a mark of the cognitive, a principle demarcating the cognitive. Desiderata for a principle of demarcation are set out. Various principles supportive of the extended view are considered, and it is argued that they fall short of the desiderata or are unsatisfactory on independent grounds. These candidate criteria include causal, metaphysical, and epistemic principles, as well as proposals gleaned from Clark and Chalmers's paper, “The Extended Mind.”