European Journal of Philosophy
July 5, 2024
F. Zahnoun, Luca Roccioletti, Erik Myin
1 citation
Much of contemporary philosophy of perception revolves around the question of whether perceptual experience has representational content. On one side of the debate, we find representationalists claiming that perceptual experience is representational in that it always presents the world as being a certain way. Perceptual experience is therefore said to have content, which can be evaluated for...
Synthese
2021
Erik Myin, Jasper C. Van den Herik
34 citations
The Radical Enactive/Embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of skilled performance. Yet REC also makes a distinction between basic and content-involving cognition, arguing that the development of basic to content-involving cognition involves a kink. It might seem that this distinction leads to problematic gaps in REC's story. We address two such alleged gaps...
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
15 citations
Abstract E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly...
The MIT Press eBooks
May 19, 2017
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
482 citations
Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of...
Evolving Enactivism
May 19, 2017
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
Chapter 4 provides further examples of RECtification, this time with the aim of showing how REC can fruitfully ally with and strengthen two prominent nonrepresentational E-approaches to cognition—Autopoietic-Adaptive Enactivism and Ecological Dynamics. These examples of RECtification reveal REC’s capacity to marshal and combine powerful resources for explaining basic minds in naturalistic...
Evolving Enactivism
May 19, 2017
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
This chapter introduces the E-turn in cognitive science –the move to embrace enactive, embodied, extended and ecological views of cognition–and the empirical and theoretical considerations that spurred it on. It explains how E-approaches differ from classical forms of cognitivism: in particular the degree to which different E-approaches move away from the cognitivist commitments to...
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
2014
Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D Kirchhoff, Erik Myin
94 citations
Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from...
The MIT Press eBooks
December 14, 2012
Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin
515 citations
A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless. Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated,...
Science
October 29, 2010
Erik Myin
The contributors examine Clark and Chalmers's claim that the mind is not confined to the head but extends into the world and discuss its implications.