Representation and mental representation
Philosophical Explorations May 4, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2018.1477979 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 40 |
| Key points | Argues that the "as-such" and "job-description" problems raised by enactivists do not constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content, and proposes a positive account of mental representation inspired by Dretske's views and by the role of representations in cognitive scientific modeling. |
Abstract
This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific modeling.