4 Realization and Extended Cognition
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind November 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a realization-based interpretation of the extended mind thesis is untenable because it either undermines the motivating examples or is too liberal for cognitive science. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter addresses a realization-based interpretation of the extended approach. On this view, cognitive states are states of an organismically bounded cognitive system, yet may still have realizers—that is, physical implementations—that extend beyond the boundary of the organism. Functionalism in philosophy of mind, as well as the associated idea of a physical realization, is spelled out in detail. It is then argued that the extension-friendly approach to realization is untenable. The relevant view of realization either undermines the examples motivating the extended view or is too liberal to be of use in cognitive science. Difficulty with this view arises largely because standard examples of extended cognitive processing involve interactions with the environment, and during these interactions, the realizers of the cognitive states at issue are distinct from those things with which the cognitive system interacts.