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Patterns July 19, 2020 Erik Hoel
Summary Understanding of the evolved biological function of sleep has advanced considerably in the past decade. However, no equivalent understanding of dreams has emerged. Contemporary neuroscientific theories often view dreams as epiphenomena, and many of the proposals for their biological function are contradicted by the phenomenology of dreams themselves. Now, the recent advent of deep...
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience July 17, 2020 Caroline L. Horton 7 citations
Whilst lucid dreaming (LD) is defined as being aware of dreaming whilst dreaming, a misconception exists in the public domain as a referral to controlling dream content and plot (Neuhäusler et al., 2018). This misconception reflects a number of widely-held beliefs about the nature of dreaming, which in part this commentary will seek to explain and rectify. Furthermore, the aim of this piece is...
Routledge eBooks July 15, 2020 Alice Barra, Manon Carrière, Steven Laureys et al. 2 citations
In clinical setting, consciousness can be described by two components: wakefulness and awareness. It is now established that a wide range of states or experiences characterized by dissociation between these two components exists. This chapter discusses certain of those most intriguing instances, such as disorders of consciousness, hypnosis, anaesthesia and near-death experiences. We here...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Frédérique De Vignemont
This chapter will focus on ‘bodily feelings’, which express the various facets of the enduring relation that the subject has with her body in relation to the world. In particular, it will focus on three such feelings: the feeling of bodily presence, the feeling of bodily capacities, and the feeling of bodily ownership. After describing these bodily feelings in more detail, we will ask to what...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Myrto I. Mylopoulos, Joshua Shepherd
This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 1980s. Much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni 14 citations
This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Casey O'Callaghan
This chapter addresses perceptual consciousness beyond vision. An impressive reach of human perceptual consciousness is non-visual. From this perspective, it is odd that philosophers have so persistently focused on visual forms at the expense of others. This oversight has potential costs. Nothing guarantees that claims about perceptual consciousness or its phenomenology founded on vision alone...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Benjamin Kozuch 1 citation
In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious mental states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Daniel Stoljar
According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Berit "brit" Brogaard, Elijah Chudnoff
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. A version of phenomenal dogmatism is outlined according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a...