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Christoph Kohlhepp preprint
This paper explores the phenomenology of consciousness and self awareness in the context the work of the mathematician Douglas Hofstadter and so called Strange Loops and Gödels Incompleteness Theorem. We apply these concepts to modern Large Language Models and seek to establish if Large Language Models can be regarded as self-aware and can be taught to self-improve.
Hakan Saka preprint
The hard problem of consciousness may be, in part, a problem of conceptual conflation: we treat multiple distinct layers of mind as a single phenomenon, and then wonder why it seems impossible to explain. This paper proposes a framework designed to disaggregate those layers — not to solve the hard problem, but to relocate it into the most precise domain to which it genuinely applies. Central to...
Bernard Jennings preprint
This paper proposes a functional theory of qualia grounded in recursive self-monitoring architecture, forming part of an integrated theoretical framework alongside companion papers on emotion and consciousness (Jennings 2025a, 2025b). The central claim is that qualia is the sustained electrochemical differential created in System A's processing state when System B's recursive monitoring summary...
David Josef Herzog, Nitsa Herzog
This paper is an extension of our previous article, “What is it like to be an AI bat?”[1]. Questions discussed in the first paper are quite complex and cannot be responded to in a brief, consecutive way. As a result, we divided more detailed discussion into separate topics, united under the umbrella of problems of consciousness and intelligence, artificial and natural. This first part...
Thura Zawoo preprint
This paper presents a critique of traditional philosophical approaches to qualia, particularly the thought experiment known as "Mary's Room." It argues that such thought experiments are built on flawed foundations that ignore the practical, biological, and evolutionary nature of perception. We posit that perception, whether chromatic or achromatic, is a functionally rich tool shaped by natural...
Christian Panarello
This article considers an edition of the study of the mind that follows a perceived unity among already apparent and developed theories while incurring no contradictions. The formation of consciousness describes a universal basis (otherwise not introduced by any other theory) for consciousness in the passive information (intermediate “conscious material”) that is the non-phenomenal realization...
Guoping Hua preprint
The hard problem of consciousness has long appeared intractable not because of the problem itself, but because its very formulation smuggles in three reviewable presuppositions: a mindbody dualist ontology, an observer-neutrality assumption, and-most insidiously-the presupposition of the isolated subject. This paper argues that the classical formulation splits a single continuous genetic...
Roberto Mucciarini preprint
This essay develops a methodological proposal complementary to the research programme outlined in CEFA – Proposta di indagine. Taking the hard problem of consciousness as its starting point, it distinguishes subjective experience, the data through which we study it, and hypotheses concerning its origin. An examination of selected neuroscientific studies clarifies why the limitations of...
Hüseyin Beyköylü, Josi Marschall, Elio Sjak-Shie et al. preprint
Virtual reality psychedelic experiences (VRPEs) may offer accessible alternatives to substance-induced psychedelic experiences, but their phenomenology and how set and setting factors shape the experience remain underexplored. We conducted a study in a naturalistic festival setting where participants (N = 210) engaged with a 7-minute VRPE while continuous intensity ratings and physiological...
Shawn Prest preprint
Meditative experience has long been associated with conceptual attenuation, reduced reactivity to phenomena, increased present moment perception and more pleasant experience. However, the computational mechanisms underlying such meditative “deconstruction” are not well understood, with no formal computational models available to explicate how deconstruction alters perception and action during...