Brain and Cognition
June 1997
M A Bedau
The dynamical patterns in mental phenomena have a characteristic suppleness--a looseness or softness that persistently resists precise formulation--which apparently underlies the frame problem of artificial intelligence. This suppleness also undermines contemporary philosophical functionalist attempts to define mental capacities. Living systems display an analogous from of supple dynamics....
Oxford University Press eBooks
May 29, 1997
Mitsuo Kawato
13 citations
This chapter proposes several computational hypotheses about consciousness based on the recent studies on motor control and vision. Consciousness is classified into three different levels: vigilance, coherent perception and behaviour, and self-consciousness. This chapter focuses on the latter two classifications because the bidirectional theories developed in computational studies of motor...
The End of Magic
May 15, 1997
Ariel Glucklich
Abstract: Westerners who arrive in Banaras, a city in India, to conduct research, study music, or just live among Indians, waste no time in shedding the outer signs of their Western identity in favor of kurtas and pajamas. During the past century, the phenomenon of magic, which is dispersed more widely than even religion, has been attacked from various quarters. On the one side have been the...
The End of Magic
May 15, 1997
Ariel Glucklich
AbstractPhenomenology and system theory are the foundations of the “magical experience.” They offer a way out of the body/mind impasse. Magic, taken as an experience rather than as a doctrine, is the very consciousness of an overall interactional system that defies the logic of composite parts. The philosophical and anthropological underpinnings of this claim can be found in part in the...
Neuroscience
May 1997
D Kahn, Edward F Pace-Schott, J A Hobson
State-dependent aspects of consciousness are explored with particular attention to waking and dreaming. First, those phenomenological differences between waking and dreaming that have been established through subjective reports are reviewed. These differences are robustly expressed in most aspects of consciousness including perception, attention, memory, emotion, orientation, and thought. Next,...
Journal of Neuroscience
April 15, 1997
Bita Moghaddam, Barbara W. Adams, Anita Verma et al.
1,813 citations
Subanesthetic doses of ketamine, a noncompetitive NMDA receptor antagonist, impair prefrontal cortex (PFC) function in the rat and produce symptoms in humans similar to those observed in schizophrenia and dissociative states, including impaired performance of frontal lobe-sensitive tests. Several lines of evidence suggest that ketamine may impair PFC function in part by interacting with...
Consciousness and Cognition
March 1997
Tracey L. Kahan, Stephen LaBerge, Lynne Levitan et al.
Thirty-eight "practiced" dreamers (Study 1) and 50 "novice" dreamers (Study 2) completed questionnaires assessing the cognitive, metacognitive, and emotional qualities of recent waking and dreaming experiences. The present findings suggest that dreaming cognition is more similar to waking cognition than previously assumed and that the differences between dreaming and waking cognition are more...
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica
March 1997
P J Alexander, S Joseph, A Das
Studies of psychiatric out-patients from India have found that diagnosis of some of the subcategories of the dissociative and conversion disorders of the ICD and DSM classificatory systems are rarely made in this setting. Moreover, it was found that a significant percentage of patients seen in psychiatric practice may not fit into the defined subcategories of dissociative (conversion) disorders...
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
March 1, 1997
Thomas Natsoulas
According to William James, bodily self-awareness (bodily feeling) is pervasive throughout the stream of consciousness; such awareness is included in each and every pulse of mentality that makes up the stream of consciousness. This installment of the present series of articles begins to consider the role that bodily self-awareness plays in the very structure of the basic durational components...
Anthropology of Consciousness
March 1, 1997
E. Richard Sorenson
As was seen in paper IV of this series (Anthropology of Consciousness 7[4]: 9‐30), basic consciousness can differ strikingly across eras. The type detailed there belongs to a preconquest era that survives today only in isolated enclaves that have not yet been absorbed within the thrall of conquering cultures. There are very few still left. Significantly they are widely distributed across the...