Consciousness and Cognition
June 1, 1998
T C Dalton
J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a...
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
June 1, 1998
M Kurthen, T Grunwald, C E Elger
20 citations
Neuroscientists and philosophers nowadays claim that the problem of phenomenal consciousness is a scientific problem. Increasing knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness is expected to yield an explanation of consciousness in neuroscientific terms. On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that even complete knowledge of brain function will leave unanswered the question of why...
Advances in Consciousness Research
May 15, 1998
Leopold Stubenberg
This is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Phenomenal properties or qualia are problematical because they lack appropriate bearers. The relation of having is problematical because none of the typical candidates for this relation — introspection, inner...
Journal of Abnormal Psychology
May 1998
J C Scroppo, S L Drob, J L Weinberger et al.
This study compared 21 female adult psychiatric patients diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder (DID) with 21 female adult nondissociative psychiatric patients to determine whether DID patients exhibit a distinguishing set of clinical features, and perceptual, attentional, and cognitive processes. Participants were assessed with the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule to assess...
Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior
April 1998
Aino Kankaanpää, E Meririnne, P Lillsunde et al.
The acute effects of amphetamine derivatives on extracellular concentration of serotonin (5-HT) and dopamine in the nucleus accumbens were studied with in vivo microdialysis using conscious, freely moving rats. 5-HT, dopamine, and their major metabolites were measured by HPLC with electrochemical detection. Amphetamine (1.0-9.0 mg/kg) elevated dopamine levels considerably, but failed to affect...
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
April 1, 1998
S R Hameroff
Age-old battle lines over the puzzling nature of mental experience are shaping a modern resurgence in the study of consciousness. On one side are the long-dominant `physicalists' who view consciousness as an emergent property of the brain's neural networks. On the alternative, rebellious side are those who see a necessary added ingredient: proto-conscious experience intrinsic to reality,...
Phytomedicine
April 1, 1998
Neville S. Arachchige Don, Bruce E. Mcdonough, Gabriel Acácio de Moura et al.
33 citations
EEG data were recorded under field conditions from 11 members of the Santo Daime Doctrine, a Brazilian shamanistic religion, before and after ingesting the psychoactive alkaloid preparation, ayahuasca, or daime, as they term it. Post-ingestion, we observed increases in power in the 36-44 Hz frequency band ("40 Hz") from the left occipital-temporal-parietal scalp electrodes in the eyes-closed...
Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung. C, Journal of biosciences
1998
W Buschlinger, G Vollmer, H Walter
Our working assumption reads: Every mental property exhibited by a natural system can be exhibited by an artificial system, at least in principle. Is this true? The paper is in two parts. The first part is explicative: What do we mean by 'natural' or by 'artificial'? When are we ready to ascribe thinking to a system? We show that sometimes behavior is enough, sometimes underlying mechanisms are...
The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy
1998
Piotr Bołtuć
Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically...
Behavioral Medicine
1998
H Walach, E Käseberg
Mind machines are said to induce relaxation and an altered state of consciousness. The influence of optical-acoustic (OAS) and electrical stimulation (ES) mind machines on general well-being, electrodermal activity, and altered states of consciousness was investigated and compared with pure rest and a placebo. Thirty participants underwent 4 conditions in random sequence: rest, placebo...