AbstractBlock has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be...
AbstractAlthough information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
AbstractWith some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need...
Two replication studies test in Canada a field theory of the effect of consciousness on social change. The exogenous variable is the number of participants in the largest North American group practice of the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi program, in Iowa. The first study indicated a significant reduction in violent deaths (homicide, suicide, and motor vehicle fatalities), using both...
The present work is based in a dichotomy that is evident in the literature on consciousness. Research findings, which are often ‘counter-intuitive,’ are presented as being in opposition to the common (lay) perceptions of how consciousness is characterized. Authors often use these perceptions for contrast and as background against which to interpret their research results. However, the source of...
AbstractBasically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN HUSSERL Husserl is often read as an idealist, more like Kant than Berkeley, or else as a dualist, with epistemological motivations like those of Descartes. It would be only fitting for Husserl then to set aside the physical world and study pure consciousness. Phenomenology, the science of consciousness, would become the whole of philosophy. However, when we look closely...
BACKGROUND: Although considerable research has been done on pathophysiology, metabolic and physical causes, and prognostic indicators, little is known about unconsciousness or coma from the perspective of the patient. OBJECTIVE: To describe the experiences of patients who were once documented as being unconscious. METHODS: Phenomenologic interviews were conducted with 100 patients whose records...
This book is a Spanish translation of the compilation made by M. P. Pandit in English of the Kularnava Tantra from Sanskrit, with an introduction by Arthur Avalon and published in 1973. The Spanish translation was carried out by Editorial Eyras and includes a foreword by Ramiro Calle. This text is an edited version with marginal notes and highlighted sections to facilitate study, used as...
The dominant program in cognitive psychology since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s has been computationalism. Computational theories treat human cognitive processes as a species of information processing, and the systems that implement such processing as symbol-manipulating systems. Describing a device as a symbol manipulator implies that it is possible to treat some of its internal...