The hypothesis of the Basic Rest Activity Cycle (BRAC), that underlies approximately 90-min fluctuations in states of consciousness, has gained strong documentation during sleep in cyclical occurrence of its REM and NON-REM stages, however, there is no convicting evidence of this rhythm in waking. According to the concept of protective mechanisms of BRAC (Kokoszka, 1990), the rest phase of the...
Normative-IQ individuals with autism are capable of solving explicit social cognitive problems at a level that is not matched by their ability to meet the demands of everyday social situations. The magnitude of this discrepancy is now being documented through newer techniques such as eye tracking, which allows us to see and measure how individuals with autism search for meaning when presented...
Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience make possible an understanding of the neural events that are associated with different forms of consciousness. To fully understand and unveil the mystery of consciousness inside the brain we require examination of the concept of neural basis of conscious mind. This book provides a systematic exploration of consciousness and gives an overview of neural...
However, the observations encompassed by classical physics excludes the observer from the physical reality, yet the deep-down understandung of nature --{\it the quantum theory}-- can not avoid the intrusion of observer into the measurement process. Indeed, the quantum physics experiments have knocked the door of a new paradigm: in which science of consciousness is an important axiom. In the...
Abstract: The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis promotes the view that cognition, and with it consciousness, is an evolutionary adaptation that arose owing to the complexities of social life (Humphrey 1976; Whiten and Byrne 1988). According to this view, we have knowledge of our own minds because we needed to have knowledge of others’ minds. We needed to be able to predict what others were...
Abstract Qualia, or phenomenal properties of experience, pose a deep and persistent problem for Materialism. Consider the particular throbbing character of a pain in one’s toe after stubbing it, or the way a gleaming red fire engine looks in the sunlight. In both cases there is a strong intuition that we are enjoying experiences—conscious, mental states—which can be typed by their qualitative...
ConsciousnessJanuary 23, 2003Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich
Abstract The topic of self-awareness has an impressive philosophical pedigree, and sustained discussion of the topic goes back at least to Descartes. More recently, self-awareness has become a lively issue in the cognitive sciences, thanks largely to the emerging body of work on ‘mind-reading’, the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last fifteen...
Abstract There is something fundamentally disturbing about contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophical cognitive science. Almost without exception (exceptions such as Lockwood (1989) and Chalmers (1996, see esp. p. 349) ), the philosophical theories are logically inconsistent with the most well-confirmed theory ever developed by humans, namely, quantum mechanics. Why do philosophers...
ConsciousnessJanuary 23, 2003Anthony Brueckner, E Alex Beroukhim
Abstract There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as a body is by nature alway divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire ... But it is quite otherwise with corporeal...