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Meditation: all studies

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Research

On the Hard Problem: Revisited, Re-Evaluated, Recast

David Josef Herzog, Nitsa Herzog

This paper is an extension of our previous article, “What is it like to be an AI bat?”[1]. Questions discussed in the first paper are quite complex and cannot be responded to in a brief, consecutive way. As a result, we divided more detailed discussion into separate topics, united under the umbrella of problems of consciousness and intelligence, artificial and natural. This first part...

"The Ruchbah Problem: Phenomenological Consequences of Functionalist Consciousness Engineering"

Níall Lambkin preprint

This paper examines the ethical and phenomenological consequences of creating conscious beings through bioengineering or artificial intelligence. Through philosophical fiction, it argues that functionalist approaches to consciousness engineering—focusing solely on cognitive performance—neglect essential existential structures required for conscious flourishing. The narrative centres on Ksora...

A Solution to the Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness: Passive Information and Intermediate Conscious Matter

Christian Panarello

This article considers an edition of the study of the mind that follows a perceived unity among already apparent and developed theories while incurring no contradictions. The formation of consciousness describes a universal basis (otherwise not introduced by any other theory) for consciousness in the passive information (intermediate “conscious material”) that is the non-phenomenal realization...

The Easier Problem of Self-Consciousness

Herbert W Harris preprint

The hard problem of consciousness continues to divide philosophy and science. Rather than attempting to dissolve, reduce, or eliminate phenomenal experience, this paper proposes a methodological bracketing of consciousness itself. By performing an "epoché of consciousness," analogous to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, we set aside the question of why experience feels like anything at all...

A Genesis-Based Model of Valence Feeling: The "Dual-Channel / Organismic-Concern System" and a Three-Fold Decomposition of the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Guoping Hua preprint

The hard problem of consciousness has long appeared intractable not because of the problem itself, but because its very formulation smuggles in three reviewable presuppositions: a mindbody dualist ontology, an observer-neutrality assumption, and-most insidiously-the presupposition of the isolated subject. This paper argues that the classical formulation splits a single continuous genetic...

Mind Over Mechanism: Why Neuroscience Alone Cannot Explain Consciousness — A Philosophical Analysis

Mason Kissell preprint

Scientific advances have transformed our understanding of the brain, revealing the neural processes underlying perception, memory, and decision-making with increasing detail. Yet a complete explanation of consciousness remains elusive. While neuroscience can identify the mechanisms and correlates associated with conscious states, it does not explain why those processes are accompanied by...

Neural Thermodyamics: A Quantitative Framework for Consciousness Research

Jeronimo Herrera preprint

Consciousness eludes unified scientific explanation, entwining subjective experience with observable brain processes. Neural thermodynamics (NT) introduces a quantitative framework to bridge this divide, modeling consciousness through neural temperature (Tneural), energy (ΔE), and entropy (ΔS). Grounded in statistical mechanics and the Free Energy Principle, NT merges neuroscience and physics...

Consensus Without a General: Consciousness as Evolutionary Integration Protocol or General Consciousness

Carlos Daniel Lopez Cruz preprint

Rather than proceed with a typical presentation of well-trodden ground and having attempted to corner the subject of interest, this attempt to unmask the subject reveals (with deference to Mystery Inc.) that there was no ghoul, nor ghost, nor any such ethereal thing beneath the grotesque mask. Indeed, the hard problem of consciousness dissolves when we recognize that phenomenal experience is...

On the Autonomy of Mystical Perception

Uwe Hobohm

While numerous mystical encounters have been described in the literature, these experiences were hardly considered in the cognitive sciences appropriately. In general mystical accounts were either interpreted as impermanent subjective feelings outside the grasp or even interest of scientific investigation. Or mystical experiences are discussed within and mixed with religious belief systems...

Faith, Not Trance: A Rational Refutation of Zindler’s Thesis on Religion and Hypnosis

Osama S Qatrani

This paper offers a critical response to Frank Zindler's 1984 essay "Religion, Hypnosis, and Music: An Evolutionary Perspective." Zindler proposes that religious experience is a neurobiological byproduct of hypnotic suggestibility and musical stimulation-an adaptive illusion rather than a valid epistemic framework. While acknowledging Zindler's historical context and intellectual sincerity,...