Experience and Representation
Consciousness January 23, 2003 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that qualia, as properties of experience, present a fundamental difficulty for materialism, illustrated through examples of pain and color perception. |
Abstract
Abstract Qualia, or phenomenal properties of experience, pose a deep and persistent problem for Materialism. Consider the particular throbbing character of a pain in one’s toe after stubbing it, or the way a gleaming red fire engine looks in the sunlight. In both cases there is a strong intuition that we are enjoying experiences—conscious, mental states—which can be typed by their qualitative character: the throbbing of the pain or the reddish character of the visual experience. In this sense the qualitative character of an experience, a quale, is a property of the experience.
Citations in the library
Cited by 7
- Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality European Journal of Philosophy June 21, 2023
- The Essential Tension in Phenomenal Consciousness Philosophical Papers January 2, 2020
- Categorical Phenomenology The Anatomy of Experience December 12, 2025
- Visual Content The Anatomy of Experience December 12, 2025
- The Phenomenology of Inference The Anatomy of Experience December 12, 2025
and 2 more in the library