4 papers in the library · publishing 2003
Consciousness January 23, 2003 David Papineau
The author argues that existing theories of consciousness are fundamentally misguided because consciousness is not a standard scientific topic. Rather than building theories as if consciousness were analogous to electricity or chemical valency, researchers should first reflect on their methodology. Doing so reveals that theories of consciousness attempt to answer a question that does not actually exist.
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Barry Loewer
The author reflects on why the global quantum correlations that appear in the formalism of quantum mechanics vanish when a conscious observer interacts with a measurement apparatus. They argue that this puzzle about consciousness should not be conflated with the task of understanding quantum mechanics as a theory of correlations among nonconscious subsystems. The author declines to speculate whether the vanishing of these correlations is due to consciousness lying outside the scope of quantum mechanics, having infinitely many degrees of freedom, or obeying special superselection rules.
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Brian P Mclaughlin
Colors have been present in visual experience since the beginning of sight, yet their fundamental nature is still debated. This dispute is closely linked to the hard problem of visual consciousness, which concerns the nature of visual awareness itself. The text argues that despite familiarity, the essence of colors remains unresolved, and understanding them is key to addressing broader questions about conscious experience.
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Michael Lockwood
The author declares a materialist view that consciousness is a type of brain activity, yet argues that no current scientific description—whether physical, physiological, functional, or computational—can adequately capture what consciousness is. The shortcomings of all reductive programs are so severe that only a deep-seated belief that physical science has essentially explained reality could make them seem plausible.