14 papers in the library · publishing 2003-2014
Consciousness 2014 Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani
Max Velmans, born 27 May 1942, is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London. In 1994, he cofounded the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society and made several publications in the area of consciousness studies, which culminated in a book titled Understanding Consciousness . In this book – which thus far has had two...
Consciousness 2014 Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani
Paul Churchland (born on 21 October 1942 in Vancouver, Canada) and Patricia Smith Churchland (born on 16 July 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada) are Canadian-American philosophers whose work has focused on integrating the disciplines of philosophy of mind and neuroscience in a new approach that has been called neurophilosophy . They are also central figures in the philosophical stance...
Consciousness 2014 Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani
Benjamin Libet (Chicago, Illinois, 12 April 1916–Davis, California, 23 July 2007) was a scientist who conducted pioneering studies on consciousness and free will. He studied physiology, and between 1945 and 1948, he worked as an assistant professor at the University of Chicago. During his academic career, he was a lecturer at the Albany Medical College, New York; research fellow in...
Consciousness 2014 Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani
John Kevin O’Regan (born on 24 May 1948) is an American neuroscientist who has lived and worked in Paris since 1971. He studied theoretical physics at Sussex and Cambridge Universities and in 1975 gained a PhD from Cambridge University for his research on eye movements during reading tasks. His interest in the study of the perceived stability in the visual process has led him to the discoveries...
Consciousness 2014 Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani
Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher currently teaching Philosophy and Law at New York University. In 1974, he published an article – titled What Is It Like to Be a Bat? – that had enormous resonance in the community of philosophers of mind. The expression used by Nagel in his article has become a mesmerizing phrase in the common usage among philosophers to indicate the subjective feature of...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Michael Lockwood
Abstract Let me begin by nailing my colours to the mast. I count myself a materialist, in the sense that I take consciousness to be a species of brain activity. Having said that, however, it seems to me evident that no description of brain activity of the relevant kind, couched in the currently available languages of physics, physiology, or functional or computational roles, is remotely capable...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Brian Loar
Abstract Two strong intuitions about visual experience seem to conflict radically. One is that visual experiences have discernible qualitative features, often called qualia. They are aspects of what it is like to have particular visual experiences, subjective or felt aspects of experiences. They present themselves as intrinsic and non-relational properties of visual experience, and they come in...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Quentin Smith
Abstract There is something fundamentally disturbing about contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophical cognitive science. Almost without exception (exceptions such as Lockwood (1989) and Chalmers (1996, see esp. p. 349) ), the philosophical theories are logically inconsistent with the most well-confirmed theory ever developed by humans, namely, quantum mechanics. Why do philosophers...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Anthony Brueckner, E Alex Beroukhim
Abstract There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as a body is by nature alway divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire ... But it is quite otherwise with corporeal...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Joseph Levine
Abstract Qualia, or phenomenal properties of experience, pose a deep and persistent problem for Materialism. Consider the particular throbbing character of a pain in one’s toe after stubbing it, or the way a gleaming red fire engine looks in the sunlight. In both cases there is a strong intuition that we are enjoying experiences—conscious, mental states—which can be typed by their qualitative...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich
Abstract The topic of self-awareness has an impressive philosophical pedigree, and sustained discussion of the topic goes back at least to Descartes. More recently, self-awareness has become a lively issue in the cognitive sciences, thanks largely to the emerging body of work on ‘mind-reading’, the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last fifteen...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 David Papineau
Abstract There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs to be handled with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Barry Loewer
Abstract When I look at the scale of the apparatus I know what it reads. Those absurdly delicate, hopelessly inaccessible, global correlations obviously vanish when they connect up with me. Whether this is because consciousness is beyond the range of phenomena that quantum mechanics is capable of dealing with, or because it has infinitely many degrees of freedom or special super selection rules...
Consciousness January 23, 2003 Brian P Mclaughlin
Abstract For those of us blessed with sight, colours have been manifest in the scenes before our eyes ever since such scenes first came into focus. Familiarity has not bred understanding, however. The nature of these old acquaintances remains a matter of dispute. The dispute is intimately tied to ‘the hard problem’ of visual consciousness-the problem of determining the nature of visual...