Block's philosophical anosognosia
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038401 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P-consciousness involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a "strong" P-consciousness, which the author contends confounds plausible research and betrays an "anosognosia" about Wittgenstein's diagnosis of philosophical "introspection" of mysterious inner processes. |
Abstract
Abstract Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 7
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Sensations January 25, 1991
and 2 more in the library