Sensations
January 25, 1991 DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781139173827 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that sensory states are identical with correlated neural states (type materialism), implying that only humans and related biological species have sensations and that silicon-based androids cannot. The author contends that rival positions such as dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, and functionalism fail, and examines introspection, sensory concepts, other minds, and unity of consciousness. |
Abstract
This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.
Citations in the library
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- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks March 29, 2004
- Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem Philosophical Psychology October 25, 2017
- The path not taken Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Toward a Mature Science of Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 2018
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