Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction
Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x97280052 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Cognition Cognitive science Empirical research Cognitive psychology Logical conjunction Empirical evidence Epistemology |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the logical success of Block's phenomenal/access distinction does not support the empirical claim that two kinds of consciousness exist. |
Abstract
P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”