Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction
Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x97280052 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractBlock's distinction between phenomenal consciousness (P) and access consciousness (A) mixes a logical distinction with an empirical claim. The logical usefulness of the P/A distinction does not make it plausible as an empirical thesis that two kinds of consciousness actually exist. It is unclear whether the P/A distinction offers any advantage over assuming a single kind of consciousness. One of Block's analogies—comparing P to liquid in a hydraulic computer—can help clarify the idea of consciousness as cognitive hardware.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Cognition Cognitive science Empirical research Cognitive psychology |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key finding | Argues that the logical success of Block's phenomenal/access distinction does not support the empirical claim that two kinds of consciousness exist. |
Abstract
P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”