Guilty consciousness
George Graham
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038279 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data, offers an alternative reading of that data, and urges Block to clarify the distinction. |
Abstract
Abstract Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1990
- Chronic behavioral disorders of human REM sleep: a new category of parasomnia. Sleep June 1, 1986