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Access, phenomenology and sorites

Miguel Ángel Sebastián

Ratio February 26, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/rati.12189 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the non-transitivity of the 'looks the same as' relation does not threaten theories of consciousness, because lookings and phenomenology can be dissociated and phenomenology is distinct from cognitive access.

Abstract

Abstract The non‐transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non‐transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter‐intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

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