We see more than we can report: "cost free" color phenomenality outside focal attention.
Zohar Z Bronfman, Noam Brezis, Hilla Jacobson, Marius Usher
Psychological Science July 1, 2014 DOI: 10.1177/0956797614532656 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Experimental study Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Sperling paradigm Attention Iconic memory Summary statistics Visual working memory |
| Citations | 140 |
| Post-publication review | 1 comment on PubPeer (opens in new tab) · last active September 2016 |
| Key findings | Participants could estimate the color diversity of noncued rows in a Sperling-like array without a cost to letter report, indicating automatic registration of color diversity outside focal attention and without additional working memory demands. |
Abstract
The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and working memory system: We see more than we can report. According to the opposed view, this perceived richness is an illusion-we are aware only of information that we can subsequently report. This debate remains unresolved because of the inevitable reliance on report, which is limited in capacity. To bypass this limitation, this study utilized color diversity-a unique summary statistic-which is sensitive to detailed visual information. Participants were shown a Sperling-like array of colored letters, one row of which was precued. After reporting a letter from the cued row, participants estimated the color diversity of the noncued rows. Results showed that people could estimate the color diversity of the noncued array without a cost to letter report, which suggests that color diversity is registered automatically, outside focal attention, and without consuming additional working memory resources.
Citations in the library
Cited by 44
- No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness Trends in Cognitive Sciences November 13, 2015
- Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- Rich conscious perception outside focal attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2014
- The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
and 39 more in the library
Cites 7
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and 2 more in the library