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A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness

Hakwan Lau, Matthias Michel

preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/ut8zq (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that the difficulty of explaining consciousness depends on the notion of explanation at play, and that the neuroscience of consciousness has been hindered by socio-historical factors that leave its basic empirical facts (the explanans) poorly established. The authors propose that the gap between ambitious explanatory aims and weak explanans may account for Chalmers's "the meta-problem".

Abstract

Whether consciousness is hard to explain depends on the notion of explanation at play. Importantly, for an explanation to be successful, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the relevant basic empirical facts (i.e. the explanans). We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at getting the basic facts right. And yet, we tend to aim for explanations of an unrealistically and unnecessarily ambitious nature. This discrepancy between ambitious notions of explanations and the relatively poor quality of explanans may account for what Chalmers calls “the meta-problem”.

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