Mind Over Mechanism: Why Neuroscience Alone Cannot Explain Consciousness — A Philosophical Analysis
Mason Kissell
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that neuroscience can identify the mechanisms and correlates of conscious states but cannot explain why those processes are accompanied by subjective experience. The author contends that this explanatory gap persists across evidence from neural correlates of consciousness, qualia, agency, AI, and contemporary theories, suggesting consciousness marks a fundamental limit of purely mechanistic explanation. |
Abstract
Scientific advances have transformed our understanding of the brain, revealing the neural processes underlying perception, memory, and decision-making with increasing detail. Yet a complete explanation of consciousness remains elusive. While neuroscience can identify the mechanisms and correlates associated with conscious states, it does not explain why those processes are accompanied by subjective experience. Drawing on evidence from neural correlates of consciousness, qualia, agency, AI, and contemporary theories of consciousness, this philosophical analysis distinguishes between explaining cognitive function and explaining conscious experience itself. The continued persistence of this explanatory gap suggests that consciousness represents a fundamental limit of purely mechanistic explanation and remains one of the central unresolved questions in both neuroscience and philosophy.