Review: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem, Unsolved Mysteries of the Mind: Tutorial Essays in Cognition, the Design of Everyday Things

Abstract

In some respects in reading this book I was reminded of the debate surrounding the publication of John Searle's paper entitled ``Minds, brains and programs''. Was I going to emerge from this process with a feeling of achieving some kind of `enlightenment', or was I going to be left in some kind of frustrating void? In 1994 David Chalmers presented a keynote paper to the `̀ Towards a scientific basis for consciousness'' conference in Tucson, Arizona. This paper and responses to it were initially presented as a special issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies. This volume is a replication of this debate, with Chalmers's response to this response incorporated in it. In his keynote paper, Chalmers outlines what he calls the `hard problem' of consciousness as opposed to the `easy problems'. It seems that the hard problem is quite simply the problem of subjective experience. We can address the so-called easy problems, of explaining basic cognitive functions, both structurally and functionally, but how those things give rise to our subjective experience is where the problem, if indeed there is a problem, lies. The responses to Chalmers's definitions of easy and hard problems of consciousness are grouped into six categories: Deflationary Perspectives, The Explanatory Gap, Physics, Neuroscience and Cognitive Science, Rethinking Nature, and finally First-person Perspectives. Shear points out in his introduction, quite rightly, that many of the papers would have fitted very well in more than one single group. All the key theorists and researchers are represented. Essentially there are two global perspectives on solving the hard problem: Those that think it is unsolvable, and those that think we have the means to provide explanations and even solutions. The book is organised in such a way that the first two categories find themselves arguing that the hard problem is unsolvable, whereas the following four argue that there is a possible solution. Deflationary Perspectives argue that we are not in a position to even address the hard problem with our current understanding of brain function. Patricia Churchland enforces this view very clearly in her contribution, entitled `̀ The hornswoggle problem''. She quite rightly points out ``Given that neuroscience is very much in its early stages, it is actually not a very interesting fact that someone or other cannot imagine a certain kind of explanation of some brain phenomenon''. The Explanatory Gap corner argue that the hard problem is in fact much harder than even Chalmers has imaginedöessentially the problem of understanding how subjective experience could ever be explained is unresolvable. Following on from those unsure that a solution is possible are those arguing that the hard problem can be solved. From the Physics collection, the arguments centre around a belief that a possible solution to the problem will emerge through adopting quantum physics as a framework for explaining consciousness. Clarke discusses the non-locality of mind, and the use of quantum logic to explain that mind is not located in space at all. Neuroscience and Cognitive Science provide a diverse collection of papers, attempting to explain the relationship between consciousness and brain structure and function. Crick and Koch in their paper entitled `̀ Why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness'' suggest that the solution to the problem lies in investigating possible neural correlates of consciousness. Rethinking Nature rejects the notion that consciousness can be looked at in relation to mind alone. Rosenberg suggests that we address consciousness on a wider platform, taking into account the structure and character of nature in relation to a purely physicalist perspective that dominates our interpretations of consciousness. Finally, First-person Perspectives: The argument here is that we need to redefine the theoretical framework in which we pursue the notion of explaining consciousness. Clark argues, by taking a functional perspective, that the hard problem is all about discovering precisely which neural functions underlie subjective experience. To do this, through a scientific approach, we need to reduce the gap between consciousness and the physical world. This will be achieved through Reviews Perception, 1999, volume 28, pages 539 ^ 542