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Buddhist Non-conceptualism: Building a Smart Border Wall

Mark Siderits

Philosophy East and West July 3, 2020 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2020.0047 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Key points Argues that Dignāga's strict non-conceptualism about perception is difficult to defend because both Buddhist epistemological considerations and neuroscience challenge his sharp separation between perception and inference, and proposes drawing on Buddhist epistemology and recent philosophy of mind to develop a more defensible form of non-conceptualism.

Abstract

Abstract:Dignāga's strict non-conceptualism about perception has proven difficult to defend. Not only were there facts known to epistemologists of Dignāga's school that are hard to reconcile with his bright line of separation between perception and inference; results from neuroscience also call it into question. This essay draws on resources from both Buddhist epistemology and recent philosophy of mind in order to seek a more defensible form of non-conceptualism.

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