Becoming Minded
Buddhist Physicalism? August 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197799697.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that meta-cognition involves the subject's post-hoc application of theory of mind to their own case, supported by empirical research on cognitive development and philosophy of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter presents evidence from empirical research on cognitive development, as well as from philosophy of consciousness, for a central claim of a physicalist illusionism: that meta-cognition involves the subject’s post-hoc application of theory of mind to their own case. It explores recent work on the child’s acquisition of theory of mind, and the debate concerning whether there is an asymmetry between the child’s mastery of first-person and third-person attribution of mental states. The consequences of this debate for an account of meta-cognition are explored. Recent accounts of the notion of the transparency of perception are also shown to be relevant to the sort of illusionism that would be required by a Buddhist physicalism, insofar as they have direct bearing on the question of how meta-cognition is possible.