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Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

Christian Coseru

Asian Philosophy October 21, 2009 DOI: 10.1080/09552360903231018 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Citations 7
Key points Argues that Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's treatment of svasaṃvitti can be read as a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness, and rejects a foundationalist reading of their causal account of perception, while proposing that naturalized epistemology and phenomenology can help unpack the Buddhist epistemological project.

Abstract

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on buddhism, most cited first.

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