Consciousness in Early Buddhism and the Abhidharma Schools

Classical Indian Buddhist schools treat consciousness as ultimately real, a claim that a physicalist Buddhism would have to reject. The text examines whether a non-egological account of consciousness can be formulated that respects the metaphysical constraints of the Buddhist philosophical project. A central problem is that such an account fails the loneliness test required by the intrinsic-nature criterion for ultimate realities. Additionally, sorites paradoxes violate the requirement that ultimate realities be metaphysically determinate. The difficulty of explaining meta-cognition is also considered.

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter discusses the place of consciousness in early Buddhism and Abhidharma. All schools of classical Indian Buddhism hold that consciousness is ultimately real, a claim a physicalist Buddhism would have to deny. The question is raised whether a non-egological account of consciousness can be formulated in a way that is consistent with the metaphysical scruples shaping the Buddhist philosophical project. A core difficulty is that no such account seems able to comply with the loneliness test imposed by the intrinsic-nature criterion for ultimate reals. But there are also sorites difficulties that run afoul of the requirement that the ultimately real be metaphysically determinate. The difficulty of accounting for the capacity for meta-cognition is also discussed.