Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense
Philosophy East and West 2018 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2018.0075 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Consciousness Cognition Object grammar Epistemology Cognitive science Cognitive psychology Linguistics Theology |
| Citations | 12 |
| Key points | Argues that early Buddhist exegetes encountered significant difficulties in making sense of immediate, non-conceptual cognition, contrasting their understanding with later post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology. |
Abstract
In post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology, non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpajñāna) comes to be construed as a sort of pre-reflective and self-intimating feature of all states of cognition. In earlier Buddhist Ābhidharmika exegesis, however, the closest candidate for non-conceptual cognition is the notion that the five sense consciousnesses apprehend their object-supports directly, as opposed to the sixth consciousness—mind consciousness (manovij ñāna)—which alone has the capacity for conceptual discrimination. In an oft -repeated example, visual consciousness is said to know "blue" but not "this is blue"; it is mind consciousness that knows "this is blue." This article explores the diffi culties that early Buddhist exegetes encountered as they tried to make sense of immediate, non-conceptual cognition.