A posteriori Russellian physicalism: a new solution to the meta-problem of consciousness
The Philosophical Quarterly October 22, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae127 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that orthodox Russellian physicalism and type-B physicalism cannot solve the meta-problem of consciousness, and proposes a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal concept strategy, as a physicalist realist solution that avoids illusionism. |
Abstract
Abstract The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we believe that there is a hard problem of consciousness. A solution to the former promises to take us one step closer to solving the latter. While many hope for a physicalist realist solution to the meta-problem, I argue that the two prominent physicalist realist positions in the literature, orthodox Russellian and type-B physicalism, cannot deliver a solution. I then introduce a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal concept strategy, and show that it can overcome the difficulties of traditional Russellian and type-B physicalism. If successful, the paper shows that physicalists need not turn to illusionism because the prospects for a physicalist realist answer to the meta-problem are bright.