Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
Philosophical Studies April 19, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-01955-1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that Russellian physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without either embracing an anti-realist, self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or abandoning its physicalist credentials, and therefore should not be favored over Type-B physicalism. |
Abstract
Abstract Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard Type-B physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable.
Citations in the library
Cites 8
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford University Press eBooks July 9, 2020
- Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem Philosophical Psychology October 25, 2017
- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Explain Problem Intuitions Journal of Consciousness Studies July 14, 2022
and 3 more in the library