Lightweight and heavyweight anti-physicalism
Damian Aleksiev
Synthese April 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03506-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that anti-physicalists have two viable responses to Schaffer's ground functionalism: "lightweight anti-physicalism," which rejects the assumption that macrophysical entities are something over and above fundamental entities and is already safe from the challenge, and "heavyweight anti-physicalism," which accepts that assumption but contends the consciousness explanatory gap is especially mysterious and requires special explanation. In both cases, the author argues, the consciousness explanatory gap remains a good way to argue against physicalism. |
Abstract
I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If ground functionalism is true, arguments against physicalism based on the explanatory gap between the physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, I argue that some anti-physicalists are already safe from Schaffer’s challenge. These anti-physicalists reject an underlying assumption of ground functionalism: the assumption that macrophysical entities are something over and above the fundamental entities. I call their position “lightweight anti-physicalism.” Second, I go on to argue that even if anti-physicalists accept Schaffer’s underlying assumption, they can still argue that the consciousness explanatory gap is especially mysterious and thus requires a special explanation. I call the resulting position “heavyweight anti-physicalism.” In both cases, the consciousness explanatory gap is a good way to argue against physicalism.