Folk Ontology and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness: Commentary on Weisberg-Physicalism
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2025 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.32.7.186 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Weisberg-physicalism is less successful on the meta-problem of consciousness than on the first-order problem of consciousness, and proposes an alternative approach that traces the problem of consciousness back to the structure of our folk ontology. |
Abstract
Josh Weisberg develops a form of physicalism which attempts to (a) show why there is no ultima facie explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world, while (b) making us see why there nonetheless is a prima facie explanatory gap. The former constitutes a solution to the problem of consciousness, the latter a proposal regarding the meta-problem of consciousness (the problem, roughly, of understanding why there is a problem of consciousness to begin with). Together, they are intended to produce a debunking explanation of the explanatory gap, and a comprehensive approach to the philosophical puzzlement generated by the existence of consciousness in an otherwise purely physical world. I will argue that Weisberg-physicalism is less successful on the meta-problem of consciousness than on the first-order problem and will sketch an alternative approach, one that traces the problem of consciousness back to the structure of our folk ontology.