“The problem of the relation of mind and matter can be completely solved” (Russell 1959)

The chapter argues that Bertrand Russell's neutral monism, often mischaracterized in contemporary philosophy, coherently resolves the mind–body problem. Russell simultaneously identifies as a neutral monist, a materialist, and a physicalist in the original senses of those terms, while being a realist about consciousness. He contends that conscious experience reveals something of the intrinsic nature of the physical world. He remains officially agnostic about panpsychism, though consistently open to it. The author defends Russell's own claim to have completely solved the mind–body problem against common misunderstandings.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract One hears a great deal about “Russellian physicalism”, “Russellian panpsychism”, and “Russellian monism”. They’re proposed as solutions to the so-called mind–body problem. There is, however, a great deal of unclarity about Russell’s views on this matter. This is partly his own fault. It’s well known that he endorses “neutral monism”, but he’s also prepared to call himself a materialist or physicalist, and at one point claims to find himself “driven to a position not unlike that of Berkeley without his God”; and, in all this, he claims to have “completely solved” the mind–body problem. This chapter argues that Russell has good reason to make this last claim, and it defends his self-understanding: (1) he is indeed a neutral monist, as he understands the term; (2) he is indeed a materialist and a physicalist, in the original and best senses of these terms; and (3) he is an outright realist about consciousness who takes it that one knows something of the intrinsic nature of the physical simply in having conscious experience. (4) He is also consistently open to the idea that some form of panpsychism is true, while remaining officially agnostic.