The Epistemic View of Subjectivity
The Journal of Philosophy 1994 DOI: 10.2307/2940751 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 91 |
| Key points | Argues that the problem of qualia—the purely subjective phenomenal properties of experience—can be addressed without adopting mind-body dualism, even if qualia are not fully understood. |
Abstract
L'A. se penche sur le probleme des qualia, les proprietes phenomenales d'un individu qui font de ses experiences et perceptions, des faits purement subjectifs. Il tente d'en comprendre la nature, et montre que le dualisme âme-corps peut etre evite meme si l'on ne parvient pas a une comprehension des qualia
Citations in the library
Cited by 9
- Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007
- Phenomenal Concepts Philosophy Compass March 28, 2011
- The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy October 16, 2019
- On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness Australasian Journal of Philosophy June 9, 2010
- Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness Thinking about Consciousness April 25, 2002
and 4 more in the library