Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness
Tiziana Zalla, Adriano Palma
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038462 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that feeling-of-knowing states, if correctly interpreted as conscious, would show a form of phenomenal consciousness that is dissociated from access, meaning subjects can have a conscious experience of a content without being able to access that content. |
Abstract
Abstract In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
Citations in the library
Cites 6
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1990
and 1 more in the library