Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038462 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that feeling-of-knowing states, if correctly interpreted as conscious, would show a form of phenomenal consciousness that is dissociated from access, meaning subjects can have a conscious experience of a content without being able to access that content. |
Abstract
Abstract In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.