Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable
Adam Morton
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0003836x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the determinacy of conscious content links Block's phenomenal and access consciousness, so that the two cannot be separated as long as content remains determinate. |
Abstract
AbstractIn common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the (single) way an experience feels, the (single) line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
Citations in the library
Cites 6
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1990
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