More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0003822x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness can be empirically dissociated for theoretically sophisticated observers, and that phenomenal consciousness has several degrees that are indirectly measurable. |
Abstract
Abstract Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 7
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Sensations January 25, 1991
and 2 more in the library