Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism

Panpsychism holds that some fundamental properties of reality are mental or proto-mental. Contemporary versions often combine with Russellian monism, which claims the intrinsic properties of physical things are unknown, allowing panpsychists to argue those properties are mental. This paper examines three arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. Each argument implies a different version of panpsychism. The Hegelian and Agnostic Arguments can both yield Russellian panpsychism, but their philosophical consequences differ, warranting two distinct kinds. The author concludes that the Agnostic Argument is more promising because it addresses general problems of panpsychism.

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Abstract

Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism.