Panpsychism: A Meta-View in the Philosophy of Mind

Panpsychism is presented as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than a position competing with materialism or dualism. Proponents of certain versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, non-standard physicalism, or idealism may be guided by panpsychist assumptions. Examples include Chalmers' naturalistic dualism, Strawson's physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge's idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel's remarks on dual-aspect theory. As a meta-view, panpsychism provides a framework for analyzing how these positions address the mind-body problem. The solution to the mind-body problem remains neutral toward these positions, and attention should instead focus on the combination problem.

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Abstract

In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view. For example, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, Strawson’s physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge’s idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel’s remarks on dual-aspect theory. I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyze how these positions address the mind-body problem. Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mind-body problem itself remains neutral toward these positions. Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, attention should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem.