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Triangulating phenomenal consciousness

Patricia Kitcher

Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038310 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 6
Key points Argues that Block's distinction between phenomenal and monitoring consciousness is flawed because monitoring itself involves possessing states and phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves monitoring. Proposes that "phenomenal consciousness" may instead refer to the ability to monitor rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.

Abstract

Abstract This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.

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