What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?
Roger N. Shepard
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038413 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
Abstract
Abstract If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things (other than myself) enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
Citations in the library
Cites 6
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1990
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