Fallacies or analyses?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038231 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 13 |
| Key points | Argues that Block's claim of a fallacy in conflating phenomenal and access consciousness requires two distinct claims, both of which are doubtful. Proposes that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access, undermining the distinction. |
Abstract
Abstract To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that theconceptof phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness. Philosophical Studies 2018
- On a confusion about there being two types of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 17, 2025
- An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997
Cites 5
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- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
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- Chronic behavioral disorders of human REM sleep: a new category of parasomnia. Sleep June 1, 1986