Representation and Extension in Consciousness Studies

Some theories hold that conscious phenomena arise solely from brain activity, while others see them as emerging from the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. This paper examines whether these divergent views apply at different scales, as in physics, or can be reconciled. By analyzing how the term "representation" is used, the author suggests it may help bridge the gap between these poles over the long term. The argument draws on philosophical insights from Descartes, James, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty, as well as global workspace theory and embodied and enacted cognition. The author proposes that a broader investigative horizon will reduce ambiguity around the concept of representation.

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Abstract

Various theories suggest conscious phenomena are based exclusively on brain activity, while others regard them as a result of the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. In this paper, I will consider whether this divergence entails the acceptance of the fact that different theories can be applied in different scales (as in the case of physics), or if they are reconcilable. I will suggest that investigating how the term representation is used can reveal some hints, building upon which we can bridge the gulf between the two poles in the long run. In my argumentation I will rely on some earlier philosophical insights, such as those of Descartes, James, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, as well as research based on global workspace theory, and the conceptions of embodied and enacted cognition. I will suggest that within a wider horizon of investigation, the ambiguity as regards the term representation will decrease.