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Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories

Evan Thompson, M. Stapleton

March 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that the enactive approach and extended mind thesis differ fundamentally on internalism versus externalism, cognition-emotion relations, the body's status, and incorporation versus extension, with implications for cognitive science.

Abstract

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

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