Extending the classical view of representation.
AB Markman, E Dietrich
Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 1, 2000 DOI: 10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01559-x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, while the insights of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems should be incorporated into models of cognitive processing rather than replacing the representational approach. |
Abstract
Representation has always been a central part of models in cognitive science, but this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating the alternative approaches of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the representational view and these four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
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